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I.

Introduction
The collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern European countries in the late

1980’s led the countries into a drastic political, social and economic transformation. The
fundamental economic restructuring consisted of three main processes: macroeconomic
stabilization, market liberalization and privatization. A vital part of this triad,
privatization, was expected to restructure the ownership patterns held for the past 50
years, create a social class of entrepreneurs and, thus, change the manner of operation of
enterprises and achieve greater economic efficiency (Eggertson, 1997).
Voucher privatization, a kind of large-scale privatization, was of special
importance. It was conducted in order to redistribute property among the population in a
socially fair way in a situation of complete lack of domestic private capital. It was also
thought of as a way to speed up the transition in the economy.
In my study, I plan to analyze voucher privatization in the Czech Republic. This
process is best characterized as decision making under both risk and uncertainty, where
the thousands of individuals who initially received vouchers were operating under near
total uncertainty while larger institutional investors who later seized control of the
vouchers were operating under conditions of risk. I will analyze the resulting patterns of
ownership in comparison to the goals of the process. I will also discuss the role of the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank as institutions which affect the conditions
under which voucher privatization was conducted. In particular, I will explore how the
situation of asymmetric information in the privatization process led to the establishment
of institutions and the concentration of ownership in the hands of a few individuals who
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have neither the skill nor the incentives to initiate change in the enterprises (Fullerton,
1998. Nellis, 1999).

II.

Background information on voucher privatization in the Czech Republic

Description of the process of voucher privatization
Three kinds of privatization were used in the Czech Republic – small-scale
privatization, large-scale privatization, and restitution. Small-scale privatization targets
smaller companies, while large-scale privatization focuses on transferring ownership of
large enterprises and corporations. In addition, a distinction is made between classical
and voucher-style privatization. The classical methods, often called the standard methods,
are auctions, direct sales and tenders. The voucher-style is a non-classical approach that
uses coupons instead of currency. The large-scale voucher privatization is the one this
paper will be discussing (Schmidt and Schneitzer, 1997).
The legal basis of large-scale privatization is the Large Privatization Act of 1991.
It states as possible methods for major privatization, direct sale to "assigned owner" (i.e.
without tender), a tender, an auction, a free transfer of shares to local authority, pension
fund or health insurance fund, sale of shares on the capital market and voucher
privatization (Nemcova, 1998). Most enterprises were privatised by use of a combination
of several of these.
The preparatory period for large-scale privatization started in the autumn of 1991
and finished at the beginning of 1992. It involved privatization project submission and
approval. The managers of all state-owned enterprises, which were to be privatised, were
obliged to create a proposal that included a full description and evaluation of the firm and
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their suggestion for its future privatization. All physical and legal bodies interested could
also submit a proposal for the privatization of an SOE (state owned enterprise) or a part
of it. The Ministry of Administration of National Property and its Privatization1 reviewed
the privatization projects for every company and decided on which ones to implement.
The National Property Fund2, a public body established by the Government and
subordinate to and supervised by the MANPP (The Ministry of National Property and
Privatization), was then responsible for materialising the approved projects.
Voucher privatization was conducted in order to redistribute property among the
Czech population in a situation of lack of domestic capital. The process is described in
the Scenario of the Economic Reforms (1989) as "the one and only possibility of how to
involve the broadest section of the population in the process of major privatization within
a relatively brief period of time." (Scenario of the Economic Reforms) Voucher
privatization is “a process in which a substantial portion of an economy’s public assets is
quickly transferred to a large, diverse group of private buyers” (Mejstrik, 1997). The
process is described in detail in Appendix A.

III.

The Voucher Privatization Process as a Game
By deciding to conduct voucher privatization the Czech Government was

attempting to set up a game in which the country’s citizens are the players and the
outcomes of the game are ownership and control of former state property. The more
knowledgeable voucher holders have a better chance of being winners in the game. Those

1

Further information on the Ministry of National Property and its Privatization can be found at
<http://www.psp.cz/info/government.html>
2
For more information on the National property Fund and its activities see
<http://www.pvtnet.cz/iso/www/rif/>
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with knowledge are more likely able to assess the probability of success of various
enterprises and thus acquire ownership rights in companies that will produce capital gains
for them. This gives the Government a better chance of achieving its goal – creating a
successful and competitive private sector in the Czech economy. Performing a kind of
natural selection among Czech citizens was supposed to eventually create a capitalist
society in which the economy is run by the people who have the necessary skills and
knowledge.
The following sections describe how the Government of the Czech Republic and
the IMF are the “rule setters” for the game. The players in the game are those who have
the opportunity to acquire vouchers. The early players in the process were individual
Czech citizens. Later the players were Investment Privatization Funds – a newly created
institution.
The Government as a rule setter
By giving little information about the process and conducting an intentionally
poor advertising campaign, the Czech government was creating an equal, but not
egalitarian opportunity for entrepreneurship--a situation in which only the educated,
knowledgeable citizens would own investment coupons, since they are the only ones who
would know how to manage them and benefit from the process.
The IMF as a rule setter
However, this game had another rule setter – the International Monetary Fund.
The organisation’s influence on the privatization process in the Czech Republic was
significant and ranged from advice to actual agreements. The process was completed fast,
without the necessary legal and institutional framework in place.
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The International Monetary Fund (specifically the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development) and the World Bank have both attempted to help the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe during their economic transformation. In the
words of Michael Camdessus, the Managing Director of the IMF, “Helping these
countries to reorient their economies toward market-based systems… has been one of the
Fund’s greatest challenges in its 50-year history.” (Camdessus, 1994) The IMF has
openly encouraged shocked therapy. The words if Michel Camdessus demonstrate this:
“First, and most important, the most appropriate course of action is to
adopt a bold strategy. Many countries… have by now proven the feasibility of
implementing policies of rapid – and I stress rapid - … structural reform… What
can be said about “gradualism”? The fact of the matter is that gradualism has not
been found to be an effective presumption in any of the three major policy areas.”
(Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, speech in Madrid, 1994)
Moreover, it seems that quick structural reform has been a condition for receiving
the financial assistance of the IMF:
“While all the forms of cooperation have proven essential, I would
emphasize how external financing has followed the commitment to and
implementation of appropriate policies.” (Michel Camdessus, Managing Director
of the IMF, speech in Madrid, 1994)
A detailed description of the IMF’s view on the transformation in the Czech and
Slovak Republics can be found in the publication by Bijan B. Aghiveli, Eduardo
Borensztein, and Tessa van der Willingen, entitled “Stabilization and Structural Reform
in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: First Stage” (International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC, 1992), as well as in the annual publication of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), entitled “Transition Report”. The
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development also analyses the Czech
transformation in “Transition – The First Ten Years: Analyses and Lessons for Eastern
6
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Europe and the Former Soviet Union”, published by the World Bank, Washington, DC,
2002.
Voucher privatization in practice
There were 1,664 companies that had some or all of their assets included in
voucher privatization. Voucher privatization took place in two waves, which involved,
respectively, five and six rounds. The first wave involved shares in 988 firms. The second
included shares in an additional 676 firms plus unsold shares in 185 firms carried over
from the first wave. The total book value of the equity privatised through vouchers was
more than $14 billion, about 10 per cent of the Czech Republic's national wealth.
All Czech citizens of the age of 18 and older had the opportunity to buy a
privatization coupon. Approximately 75 percent of eligible Czechs participated in each
wave, making the book value of the shares available slightly more than $1,400 per
participant in the first wave and $1,000 in the second wave.
In the first wave 72.2 percent of participants turned their vouchers over to one of
the IPFs. In the second wave a somewhat smaller 63.5 percent of participants assigned
their points to one of the funds. In addition to those who assigned their points to the
funds, between 1.5 and 2 million individuals bid their points themselves.3
The Players
Players in the game, set up as described above, are the participants who have the
opportunity to acquire ownership and control of the privatized enterprises. There are
three primary players: Investment Privatization Funds established by banks, IPFs
established by individuals, and the original voucher holders.

3

For statistics on Czech voucher privatization see http://www.freedomhouse.org/nit98/czech.html and
<http://src-home.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/eng/cee/czech-e.html>
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IPFs Established by Banks
New players, unforeseen by the rule setters became part of the game. The legal
deficiency, which combined with the information asymmetry, was compensated for
through the emergence of an institution – IPFs.
Most of the shares are still owned and managed by Investment Privatisation
Funds. These institutions are mostly owned by Czech Banks. Of these, the "Big Four" Komercni Banka, Ceska Sporitelna, CSOB, Investicni a Postovni Banka (Mejstrik, 1997)
together with the Czech Insurance Company own the vast majority of the established
shares. Surprisingly, the controlling shareholder in these five largest financial institutions
is the National Property Fund, which is controlled by the state. This situation of state
control over a large amount of the privatised property questions the entire success of the
voucher scheme. A spider web of confusion is created around the control of the shares
owned by the big four banks and the insurance companies, since they each bought
controlling shares in the other four.
IPFs Established by Individuals
Other IPFs were established by individuals. The biggest one of this group is The
Harvard Funds, established by Viktor Kouzeny – a graduate of the Harvard Economics
department and a Czech citizen. The Harvard Funds were the first IPF to advertise in the
media, and they ended up as the third largest IPF They acquired a total of 931 million
vouchers, which amounts to over 11% of coupon books available. Again, the situation
became more complicated when the Harvard Funds initiated a joint venture with Stratton
Investments, a company also initiated by Viktor Kouzeny. Controlling stakes of Czech
companies were transferred to Stratton Investments. It was quickly realised what had
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happened – the socially fair way of privatisation had been used as a way of acquiring
ownership and control of a significant part of the Czech economy by one individual.
The Individual Voucher Holders
The voucher holders, the ones who were meant to participate in the game setup by
the Government and IMF, did not end up with a significant role in it. The framework of
the game put them in a situation, which did not give them an opportunity to be winners.
The discrepancy in the demand for vouchers expected by the Government and the actual
public demand illustrates this. It was expected that about 30% of all eligible citizens
would participate in voucher privatisation. Instead, this figure turned to 75%. The clever
and massive advertisement campaign of IPFs, combined with attractive offers of buying
out people's shares for 10,000 CZK, thus giving them a profit of almost 9,000 CZK, were
successful in making the purchase of investment coupons seem even more attractive.
Also, the sale of the coupons to IPFs seemed to be the only reasonable opportunity to
make profit for the voucher holders. Most of them, therefore, purchased vouchers and
then quickly sold those vouchers to IPFs so that they could realize a quick profit and not
have to deal with the uncertainty of investing the vouchers by themselves. The game, as
setup by the Government and IMF, turned into a missed opportunity for them, because of
the new players and the information asymmetry among players, discussed in the
following sections.
Looking at the process of voucher privatisation in retrospect, the new owners are
not the ones the Government planned for, the new efficiency and governance of firms did
not come fast (or not at all in some cases), and the plan for a socially fair way of
privatization seems to have turned into a “give-away” of assets. The Czech citizens
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suffered from the pressure of the IPFs and were deprived of the equal and fair
opportunity the Government promised and tried to provide. Very few individuals are now
profiting investors by themselves with an active role in controlling units of production in
the economy. Largely disappointed with the process, they found their vouchers taken
over by bigger and more informed IPFs, which later reregistered as holdings. This added
another unfulfilled pre-election promise to the list. The IPFs, probably caused more
confusion than they expected and distorted a substantial part of the Czech transformation.
In this process the IPFs made a large profit. Carrying their agenda through, they are now
well-functioning holdings, owned by millionaires - the new owners of a big part of Czech
economic assets.
The establishment of the IPFs and the resulting ownership patterns described can
be understood in the context of decision taking under uncertainty theories. I present these
in the following section.

IV.

Theoretical Framework

Decision Taking Under Risk and Uncertainty
Many choices that economic agents make involve considerable uncertainty, which
has a serious impact on economic relations. Frank Knight, in his book entitled “Risk,
Uncertainty and Profits” makes a distinction between “risk” and “uncertainty”. He sees
risk in situations where the decision-maker can assign probabilities to the randomness,
which he is facing. On the other hand, he defines as uncertain situations in which this
randomness cannot be expressed in terms of mathematical probabilities. Knight’s theory
of uncertainty is also supported by Keynes, who says:
10
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"By `uncertain' knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish
what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not
subject, in this sense, to uncertainty... The sense in which I am using the term is
that in which there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable
probability whatever. We simply do not know.”
(John Maynard Keynes, "General Theory of Employment", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 1937)
In a situation of uncertainty (randomness with unknowable possibilities), the
knowledge assumption, which states that all economic agents possess full and symmetric
information, is not fulfilled. Thus, a major prerequisite for perfect competition is missing.
Lacking any understanding of which decisions are likely to lead to a desired outcome,
economic agents still have to make decisions. These decisions, according the Knight, will
lead to unexpected economic outcomes. Observations can be made that contradict
economic theory, because economic theory is constructed on the basis of competition and
some estimate of the expected outcomes of decisions.
Risk, on the other hand is defined as randomness with knowable probabilities.
The riskiness of alternative choices can be compared, as well as the probability of each
possible outcome. Various measures of risk have been developed. According to people’s
preferences towards risk, they can take decisions choosing the amount of risk they are
willing to bear.
In addition, Thomas Sowell in his book “Knowledge and Decisions” writes about
uncertainty and the cost of knowledge. According to his theory, the “most basic
economic decision is who shall decide.” Different economic agents that can take a
decision may have varying quality, quantity and cost of knowledge. The high personal
cost of acquiring expertise in an area would be an incentive to hand the decision over to
an institution that has acquired the expertise. In any situation where some economic
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agents lack information and it is costly or difficult to acquire it, an institution with better
or more knowledge is likely to arise spontaneously and make a profit from the
uncertainty the other economic agents are facing. However, Sowell believes that the
institution is not responsible for this outcome – it is just the messenger conveying the bad
news – information is not being transmitted equally.
Privatization funds in the Czech Republic appeared as a new institution because
of an information gap, as explained by Sowell’s theory. The voucher holders lacked
knowledge and it was too costly for them, if at all possible, to acquire it. After the IPFs
started to function, the Czech voucher owners were in fact facing uncertainty about the
outcomes of their possible investments. The Czech Voucher Privatization Funds, on the
other hand, are facing potential risk. The distinction between risk and uncertainty here is
used as described in the theoretical section.
Thus, there is a situation of asymmetric information, in which sellers (the original
voucher holders) are forced to make an uninformed decisions and buyers (the IPFs) have
the opportunity to make an economic profit.

V.

Empirical model – Czech buyers and sellers of vouchers under uncertainty
One of the goals of voucher privatisation was to perform a kind of natural

selection among Czech citizens. This was supposed to eventually create a society in
which the economy is run by the "best" and the production units are in the hands of
people who have the skills to make them successful. Creating a capitalist society from
scratch could have benefited a lot from such an idea. By giving little information about
the process and conducting an intentionally poor advertising campaign, the Czech
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government was creating an equal, but not egalitarian opportunity for entrepreneurship--a
situation in which only the educated, knowledgeable citizens would own investment
coupons, since they are the only ones who would know how to manage them and benefit
from the process. This, however, created an information deficiency which was
compensated for through the emergence of IPFs. The discrepancy in the demand for
vouchers expected by the Government and the actual public demand illustrates this. It
was expected that about 30% of all eligible citizens would participate in voucher
privatisation. Instead, this figure turned to 75%. The clever and massive advertisement
campaign of IPFs, combined with attractive offers of buying out people's shares for
10,000 CZK, thus giving them a profit of almost 9,000 CZK, were successful in making
the purchase of investment coupons seem even more attractive.
Looking at the founders of the IPFs it is obvious that they were the agents who
had a definite advantage in terms of information. Domestic banks had a distinct
information edge over the Czech population, based upon both long-established credit ties
with the enterprise sector, as well as good connections to the relevant public authorities
since the majority of banks are still owned by the state.
The information available to citizens was also not equal and enabled some like
Viktor Kouzheni (Harvard Capital) to establish IPFs. Certain citizens had insider
information about companies, which others weren't able to use. The information provided
for all participants in voucher privatisation by the Government was intentionally
insufficient. Consequently, the people who only relied on this and had no other means of
obtaining information were left in an unfair position. Apart from making voucher
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privatisation somewhat non-transparent and putting its fairness under doubt, this
facilitated the creation of the IPF as an institution (Hingorani, 1997).
IPFs are institutions that make decisions on behalf of a large number of small
investors.

The public profits from them because acquiring the information is too

expensive for people to acquire and they prefer to have somebody make the decision for
them. IPFs also profited. This is easily seen if we look at the main founders of IPFs. The
different founders of IPFs saw different incentives to create the funds. Looking at banks
and individuals we see their motivation and how the information gap between them and
the Czech voucher holders created a different incentive structure and outlined their
actions.
IPFs established by banks
The emergence of bank-established IPFs can be regarded as a spontaneous
institutional arrangement in a situation of insufficient information. As the state was
gradually withdrawing from the economy, lending decisions had to be taken by bank
personnel, not ordered by the Government and executed. In order to make corporate
lending by banks effective, banks had to develop ways to determine different levels of
risk associated with different clients or projects. An information asymmetry between
banks and enterprises existed, since the information about enterprises was never available
to banks during the communist period and could not become easily available during the
process of creating active new owners of firms. Banks that established IPFs and bought
shares in different companies, made significant progress in terms of information because
they could then place representatives on the board of directors. Having bank staff serving
on the board of directors of firms, provided continuous bank monitoring of the enterprises
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and resulted in a decrease of the information asymmetry. This led to more efficient
portfolio evaluation. In addition, the dual role of banks as shareholders and lenders
facilitated the informal workout procedures of problematic loans.
The investment strategy of IPFs established by banks, also demonstrates that the
banks’ goal was to obtain insider information about enterprises, which would be helpful
in making lending decisions. They spread their portfolios evenly among industries. No
sectoral specialization or concentration is observed. Banks opted for very diversified
portfolios that would allow them to have a member on the board of directors of a wide
range of enterprises. Most banks established IPFs bought shares in over 500 different
enterprises (Mejstrik, 1997). This gives useful information that is extremely relevant to
lending decisions.
IPFs established by individuals
Individual IPF founders also saw an information gap that would let them profit.
This created an entrepreneurial kind of IPF. The biggest one of those, Harvard Capital
and Consulting (HCC), had the most concentrated portfolio of all IPFs. HCC tried to
maximize their stakes in companies with a strong starting position in their industry and
placed their entire portfolio in monopolistic supply structures. They invested more than
70% of their investment points in the energy sector and the financial sector. Both are
monopolies and key sectors for the Czech economy. As the HCC’s founder stated, HCC
“favored investments that had a predominant position in the market due to their role in
the former command economy.” (Schuette, 2000)
The banking and energy sectors are highly concentrated sectors. At the time of
voucher privatization they had high market shares and were in very good condition.
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Considering their positions as monopolies and oligopolies, they were comparatively safe
investments in industries with guaranteed returns. These are industries immune to market
risks, such as changing consumer preferences or enhanced competition from other firms
in the industry. Uncertainties are linked to political risk such as lack of knowledge about
future regulatory environment. The biggest electricity producer in the country – CEZ
(Czech Power Company) is running the country’s largest existing nuclear power plant
and has a leading part in the new plant in Temelin in South Bohemia. The liabilities
resulting from two such gigantic projects are difficult to assess and bear by any outsider.
The major entrepreneurial funds are in a better position to take the risk related to
significant investments. In the words of Schuette, “from a long-term perspective,
substantial holdings in the energy sector may be a good base to acquire control over the
companies with a dominant market position in the future when the state will withdraw
from the industry.” (Schuette, 2000)
In addition, it is obvious that HCC’s goal in voucher privatization was control
over significant enterprises. The fund ended up owning a significant stake in 86% of its
companies and a controlling stake in 65% of its companies (Egerer, 1995).
In efficient Western equity markets under-priced shares are rare since share prices
reflect all public information on future earnings of an enterprise. In contrast, in a
privatization process there is much more potential to pick undervalued companies since
information is scarce and costly. IPFs had a higher probability of choosing undervalued
enterprises than individuals. Choosing cheap and undervalued shares (shares with a high
turnaround potential), required more information on companies than was publicly
available, which explains the emergence of IPFs. Since HCC had some information
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concerning the likelihood of success of enterprises, they were definitely at an advantage
over the original voucher holders, who were operating under conditions of uncertainty
(Sowell).

VI.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
The creation of investment privatization funds can be regarded as an institutional

arrangement that emerged in an economy of increasing uncertainty. Individuals sold their
vouchers to these funds because they could not accurately assess the risk of alternative
uses of the vouchers. They quickly took the price offered by IPFs and exited the game for
good. Domestic-banks sponsored funds were an arrangement that reduced the cost of
monitoring and the economic risks associated with bank lending in a situation of
uncertainty. On the other hand, funds established by individuals were entrepreneurial and
aimed at control over enterprises and the potential profits from a concentration of
ownership. As stated by Sowell’s theory, this is a logical and natural development, given
an information asymmetry between the original voucher holders and the IPFs.
This development, however, clearly altered the results of voucher privatization in
the Czech Republic, as explained earlier in Section III of this paper. The appropriate role
of the international institutions is a concern. In addition, an important question is posed as
to whether it is appropriate for international institutions as rule setters for the game to
promote and encourage the “shock therapy” approach, which involves fast privatization,
but also leaves information asymmetries among economic agents.
Thus, there are certain implications concerning future policy and the role of
international institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and
17
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the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, who are involved with assisting
the transition to a market economy. A lot of the activity of these institutions focuses on
planning out privatization and financial assistance to the transitioning countries. While
financial assistance in the forms of loans helps, it seems that more help with establishing
the appropriate institutional and legal framework for a successful transition would be
useful. This is one implication that is relevant for most of the countries in transition in
Eastern and Central Europe.
In the words of Vaclav Klaus, the economist and politician largely responsible for
the Czech economic transformation, "The speed... was regarded as absolutely essential."
(Mejstrik, 1997) Looking at how voucher privatisation happened in practice, the time
frame for conducting the two waves of privatisation was only 2-3 years, which indicates
an admirably fast sale of the property. However, the negative consequences from the
"shock therapy" approach are also obvious. Insufficient legal framework for the conduct
of privatisation accounts to a big part for the information gap created and thus, for the
establishment of IPFs. It has become clear by now that IPFs were a phenomenon which
distorted the ideas and expectation of voucher privatisation. This could have been
prevented had more time been taken in the legal preparation of voucher privatisation.
There were existing examples from Eastern European countries in transition, so the IPF
phenomenon could have been predicted had enough thought been given to possible
scenarios of the process of voucher privatisation. This was not the case, and proper
legislation for IPFs was not created, so they were able to function as limited companies
for some time. Clearly, speed had its advantages but the festina lente maxim seems like it
could have provided a better approach.

18
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The World Bank recognises this in a number of its publications. The following
quote illustrates this:
“Would countries that went through mass voucher schemes, with disappointing
results, have been better off keeping their enterprises in state hands while trying to
accelerate economic reform and creating an institutional and legal framework to attract
reputable concentrated investors?… The concentration of ownership in many voucher
privatization programs, as in the Czech Republic, owed much to poor capital market
regulation and weak rule enforcement. But if the authorities had been willing and able to
enforce an adequate regulatory framework, they probably would have been forced to
accept a longer period of diffuse ownership.” (Analyses and Lessons for Eastern Europe
and the Former Soviet Union, 2001, publication of the World Bank)

The speed of privatization accounts for the conditions under which the process
was conducted. The IPFs had the absolute advantage in the process because of their size
and access to information, which put Czech citizens wanting to invest on their own in an
unfair and unprotected position. Legislation was not ready to protect individual investors.
These factors indicate a certain questionability of the social fairness of the
process, which puts the Government and the transformation as a whole in a doubtful
position in people's eyes. It is logical that a distrust of the Government's abilities to cope
with the situation would occur after a phenomenon such as the IPFs. Also, many Czech
citizens might very well be discouraged from investing on their own after feeling in an
unfair position during voucher privatisation. This points towards talking specific
measures to protect the individual investor in developing economies, and, specifically,
the results of this study suggest making the necessary information available to individual
investors. When insiders and institutions have a definite information advantage individual
investors are discouraged.
Useful areas for future research would be the institutional and legal arrangements
that need to take place before rapid privatization in order to prevent the resulting
19
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concentration of ownership and control. The appropriate role of international institution
in the economic transition should also be explored.
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Appendix A
Description of the Voucher Privatization Process
The companies, or parts of them, that were to be privatised by the voucher
method, were transferred into private ownership according to the following procedure:
Round 0: Investment coupons are distributed, i.e. each citizen can buy a book of
vouchers with 1000 investment points. The books cost 1000 CZK, which is about
one fifth of the average monthly wage in the Czech Republic. This fee covers
only administrative costs and the costs of the networking system used during the
bidding

process.

The

voucher

book

has

no

nominal

value.

In addition, in this round the holders of investment coupons can transfer
investment points to Investment Privatization Funds in return for cash.
Investment Privatization Funds were established in the preparatory round of
voucher privatization as limited companies organised mainly by banks, insurance
companies, consultant firms and other private companies and people. The only
condition for their establishment was possession of equity capital in the amount of
1 million or more CZK, since separate legislation for them was not available and
they registered as limited responsibility companies. They functioned as issuers of
shares of stock against the reception of investment vouchers and subsequently
used these vouchers to purchase shares in SOE’s4.
Round 1: The prices of shares of all companies are uniform and determined by
the price setting agency. In the first wave the price was 100 investment points for

4

For more information on the establishment of IPFs see http://www.cerge.cuni.cz/cergeei/publicat/Books/book97.htm, Center of Economic Research at Charles University, 1997
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3 shares and in the second wave - 100 investment points for 2 shares. Each share
represented the same book value, which was around 1200 KCS for both waves.
Round 2: There are several possible developments depending on the supplydemand ratio for shares of each company.
a) If the demand and supply are equal, all orders from round 1 are met fully and
the voucher privatization of the company stops, since there are no more shares to
be sold.
b) If the supply for shares is bigger than the demand for them in the first wave,
existing orders are met fully. The remaining shares of the company are offered in
the third round at a lower price.
c) If the supply of shares is smaller than the demand and the difference between
the supplied amount of shares and the demanded amount of shares is less than
25% of the amount supplied, all orders are met in lower amounts. The voucher
privatization of the company has finished since there are no unsold shares.
d) If the supply of shares is smaller than the demand and the difference between
the supplied amount of shares and the demanded amount of shares is more than
25% of the amount supplied, none of the orders are met. All available shares of
the company are offered in the next round of privatization at a higher price.

The rounds continue until all available shares from participating companies have
been sold.
A review of the process of Czech voucher privatization is also provided by Jan
Hanousek and Randall K. Filer (Hanousek, 1999).
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